THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE ATLANTIC Volume 2, Number 5 - December 1990 THE GREAT MOON RACE: THE SOVIET STORY, PART ONE Copyright (c) 1990 by Andrew J. LePage The author gives permission to any group or individual wishing to distribute this article, so long as proper credit is given and the article is reproduced in its entirety. It has been almost thirty years since United States President John F. Kennedy gave his famous speech which committed the United States, then far behind in the Space Race with the Soviet Union, to landing a man on Earth's Moon by the end of the 1960s with the APOLLO lunar program. Both during and after the APOLLO missions there were those who wondered if a bona fide race to the Moon between the Americans and Soviets actually existed. Many Western politicians, engineers, historians, analysts, and space enthusiasts have examined official and unofficial statements made by Soviet figures, their space hardware, space launches, and declassified American intelligence and other government documents over the past decades. Their goal was to deter- mine what the Soviets' intentions were during those years when the American space program was committed to placing astronauts first on the Moon. Despite all these efforts, no Westerner could confidently resolve the issue one way or the other. The often conflicting evidence could be used to make a case for both sides of the issue. The problem was that the Soviet government never made a definitive public statement as to what their goals in space were during those early years. As a result of glastnost, however, many important pieces of the puzzle have been supplied. Scores of magazine and newspaper articles with inter- views of various key Soviet space figures, recent Soviet books and U.S./ Soviet exchanges let us confidently say that the Soviet Union did in- deed have a serious intensive program to be the first to send a man to the Moon. In fact, the race to the Moon was "neck and neck" right up to the 'end' in 1968-1969. If the American program had just one mishap during a key mission, or if the Soviets had handled their program better, or just had a bit more luck, a Soviet cosmonaut and not an American astronaut would have been the first to set foot on the surface of the Moon. If that had happened, there might have followed a new race to the planet Mars. History does not generally recognize "what ifs"; but what was the history of the Soviet Moon program? In the beginning, the Soviet manned Moon program - indeed, it can be argued the whole Soviet space program - was dominated by one brilliant individual: Sergei P. Korolev. Under his direction and with the political support of Premier Nikita Krushchev, Korolev developed civilization's first InterContinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the R-7. This rocket made a poor ICBM but a superlative space launch vehicle. It was used to launch the Soviet Union's first satellites. With the addition of an upper stage, it was used to launch the first LUNA probes to the Moon in 1959 and the manned VOSTOK craft into Earth orbit from 1961 to 1963. With an improved upper stage, the R-7 launched more advanced probes to the Moon and the first generation of unmanned Soviet vehicles to Venus and Mars. In fact, this family of rockets after over one thousand launches is still in use today, delivering everything from military reconnaissance satellites to manned ferries for the Soviet MIR space station. This rocket was to play a central role in the Soviet Union's original manned Moon program, known as SOYUZ. The original SOYUZ concept was for a simple circumlunar mission that would make use of what is still the most powerful of the R-7 launch vehicle family, now also called SOYUZ. The plan required an unfueled escape stage with a maneuvering module called SOYUZ B to be launched into Earth orbit first. Over the next few days, three tankers called SOYUZ V would be launched. These tankers would rendezvous and dock with the SOYUZ B and transfer their load of fuel to it before undocking. Finally, the manned SOYUZ A would be launched and would dock with the SOYUZ B escape stage. The SOYUZ A, like the SOYUZ B and V, was to weigh almost seven metric tons and consist of three modules. In the rear was a cylin- drical service module 2.3 meters (7.5 feet) long and 2.3 meters in diameter. It would have solar panels to supply electrical power as well as maneuvering engines, their fuel, and consumables such as air and water. Next was a bell-shaped re-entry module also 2.3 meters in diameter and 2.2 meters long. It would carry from one to three cosmonauts during launch and would later be used to bring the crew safely back to Earth at mission's end. Forward of the re-entry module was the roughly spherical orbital module, which was 2.3 meters in diameter and about 3.1 meters (10.2 feet) long, including the docking mechanism at the front. It would serve as the cosmonauts' living quarters, laboratory, air lock, and cargo hold during the mission and was connected to the re-entry module through a hatch. Once SOYUZ A and the now fully fueled SOYUZ B were docked, the escape stage would ignite and send the manned SOYUZ A on a one-week mission, where it would make a simple loop around the Moon and return to Earth for a low gravity controlled landing in Soviet territory. There appears to have been two test flights of the SOYUZ B. The first, named POLYOT 1, was launched on November 1, 1963, and the second, POL- YOT 2, was launched on April 12, 1964. Both spacecraft made extensive maneuvers in Earth orbit testing the SOYUZ B maneuvering system. By the time these test flights were made, however, Korolev's original SOYUZ circumlunar flight plan appears to have been already scrapped in favor of a much more ambitious plan to meet America's challenge. The race to the Moon had begun. In 1961, the Kremlin had broken up the Moon program into two sections. One part, a simple circumlunar flight, was headed by Vladimir N. Chelomei. The other more difficult part was an actual lunar landing. This program was headed by Korolev himself. This arrangement obviously did not sit well with Korolev. He felt the two programs should be combined into one. Two parallel projects with independently developed spacecraft and launch vehicles would take up valuable resources. For the time being, however, the government insisted on two independent manned Moon programs. Unlike Korolev's SOYUZ circumlunar concept, Chelomei wanted a single powerful rocket to launch a spacecraft towards the Moon. He felt that Korolev's concept, which required five launches of the SOYUZ launch vehicle and involved the then-unproven concept of in-orbit rendezvous and docking, was far too complicated and risky. As a result, Chelomei had to design a new and much more powerful launch vehicle. Under one of his concepts a single rocket called the UR-900 would launch a modified VOSTOK manned spacecraft to the Moon. The spacecraft would require relatively little development; there were several plans to modify the VOSTOK for future flights on the drawing boards already. The UR-900, which would have been over twice as powerful as Korolev's SOYUZ launch vehicle, would require several years of development. Little is known of Korolev's earliest thinking or plans for his manned lunar landing program. He definitely wanted to make use of the SOYUZ concept. Its modularity made for very flexible development and planning. Early on, it was obvious that a lunar landing would require a launch vehicle much larger than anything developed to that date. On the drawing boards of Korolev's design bureau was a launch vehicle called N-1. Already approved by the Soviet government in 1960, the N-1 was originally designed to be a modular, multipurpose launch vehicle capable of lifting as much as forty to fifty metric tons into Earth orbit. Korolev, who was heavily influenced by the writings of the father of Soviet cosmonautics, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935), appears to have always favored assembling his Moon craft in Earth orbit. It is likely that, as in his early SOYUZ concept, several N-1 rockets would place the components for the Moon landing mission into Earth orbit, where they would then be assembled for the journey. Orbital rendezvous and docking techniques would have to be developed to assemble Korolev's Moonship. Early test flights of the SOYUZ could be used to practice these techniques, but certain aspects of the mission could also be rehearsed using the existing manned VOSTOK spacecraft. While the relatively primitive VOSTOK required more equip- ment and maneuvering rockets to perform an actual rendezvous and docking, the initial step of placing two ships in close orbits could be accomplished. In August of 1962, VOSTOK 3 and 4 were launched just one day apart into orbits that let them pass within 6.5 kilometers (4.0 miles) of each other. The feat was repeated in June of 1963 with VOSTOK 5 and 6, which came within five kilometers (three miles) of each other while in space. The orbits were close enough that if these spacecraft had the proper equipment, the cosmonauts could have easily rendezvoused and docked with each other. In October of 1964, Kremlin politics shifted: Krushchev was ousted from power after the three-man flight of VOSKHOD 1. Korolev seized this opportunity and took over the manned circumlunar project from Chelomei. Over the next several years, Korolev gradually consolidated his power base and in the process finally defined the design and plans of the Soviet response to the American challenge for a manned lunar landing. This period of uncertainty and debate, however, cost the Soviet efforts valuable time. Important hardware, especially the all-important Moon rocket, the N-1, was constantly redesigned and upgraded. In addition, there was a deep disagreement between Korolev and his engine designer, Valentin P. Glushko, over fundamental N-1 design issues. Korolev wanted to make use of kerosene and liquid oxy- gen as propellants, perhaps even liquid hydrogen. Glushko wanted to use fluorine, nitric acid, dimethylhydrazine, and other exotic and toxic fuels. Glushko thought that there was no practical application for liquid hydrogen as a fuel; it was very light and would require prohibitively large tanks to hold it. In addition, Korolev wanted to make use of a large sychronized cluster of medium thrust engines. Glushko wanted a smaller number of high-thrust engines. In the end, Korolev and Glushko could not reach an agreement. Glushko and his design bureau boycotted the N-1 project. Needing engines for his N-1, Korolev turned to N. D. Kuznetsov and his design bureau. Kuznetsov had developed and built only aircraft engines in the past, such as those used in the Tu-144 SuperSonic Transport (SST) and other TUPOLEV aircraft, but in the early 1960s the Soviets started to back off their aircraft production. Kuznetsov and his factories in Kuibyshev needed work and this would be the perfect opportunity to diversify. In its final configuration, the N-1 was the largest rocket of its day, much larger than its American counterpart, the SATURN 5. The N-1 consisted of four stages and was about one hundred meters (330 feet) long and fifteen meters (49 feet) across at its base. Its thirty first-stage engines would produce about five thousand metric tons (eleven million pounds) of thrust at lift off and it could place 95 metric tons (210,000 pounds) of payload into Earth orbit. Its two upper stages were developed by Chelomei. A specially designed booster stage producing one thousand metric tons (2.2 million pounds) of thrust could be used with these stages to produce an interim launch vehicle. Called the PROTON, this 44.3-meter (145-foot) long launch vehicle could be used to place twenty metric ton (44,000-pound) payloads into Earth orbit or, with the addition of a special escape stage developed by Korolev, 5.5 metric tons (12,000 pounds) of payload could be launched towards the Moon. In addition to being able to test the upper stages of the N-1, the PROTON would be valuable in the Moon program on its own merits. With the launch vehicles he needed, Korolev finalized the plans for the hardware that would carry cosmonauts to the Moon. He designed three spacecraft based on his original SOYUZ concept. The L-1 was to be used for the circumlunar mission. It was essentially a SOYUZ without an orbital module. Without this module, the L-1 would weigh about 5,500 kilograms (12,000 pounds), just enough for the four-stage PROTON to launch the craft on its mission to make a simple loop around the Moon and head back to Earth with a single cosmonaut on board. The actual Moon landing mission would make use of two spacecraft. The L-2 was virtually identical to Korolev's original SOYUZ concept. The only significant difference was the addition of a torroidal fuel tank that could hold the large amounts of additional fuel needed for the Moon mission. With this tank empty, the L-2 would weigh about 6,600 kilograms (14,500 pounds) and could be launched for test flights in Earth orbit using the SOYUZ launch vehicle. Fully fueled for its trip to the Moon, the L-2 would weigh about 8,400 kilograms (18,500 pounds). The L-3 lunar cabin was the Soviet equivalent of America's APOLLO Lunar Module (LM). Like its American counterpart, the L-3 consisted of two stages: A descent stage and an ascent stage. During the descent to the lunar surface, the twenty metric ton (44,000 pound) L-3 made use of three engines, two mounted on the descent stage and one mounted on the ascent stage, all drawing fuel from the fuel tanks on the descent stage. If any problems occurred during the descent, the ascent stage with its single engine still firing could switch to its own fuel tanks, cut loose from the descent stage, and head back to lunar orbit. Otherwise, the craft could safely land a single cosmonaut on the lunar surface. The 7,500 kilogram (16,500 pound) ascent stage was essentially a modified SOYUZ orbital module with a propulsion system attached. Its primary purpose was to serve as a cockpit for the cosmonaut and to boost him from the lunar surface into orbit. The Soviet lunar landing mission would take place as follows: A PROTON launch vehicle would place a fully fueled L-2 carrying two cosmonauts into Earth orbit. Within a day, an N-1 would follow carrying the L-3, a braking stage, and an escape stage into Earth orbit. The L-2 would rendezvous and dock with this complex launched by the N-1, after which the escape stage would ignite and head towards the Moon. After it exhausted its fuel, the escape stage would be jettisoned. Upon reaching the Moon, the braking stage would ignite and place the L-2 and L-3 into lunar orbit. After casting off the braking stage, one of the cosmonauts would enter the L-3 lunar cabin and separate from the orbiting L-2. It would then fire its engines, leave orbit, and land on the lunar surface. After he collected samples and performed his experiments, the cosmonaut would re-enter the L-3 and lift off towards lunar orbit. The L-3 ascent stage and the L-2 would rendezvous and dock. After the cosmonaut transferred to the L-2 along with his samples, the L-3 would be jettisoned. Making use of the fuel in its torroidal fuel tank, the L-2 would leave lunar orbit and head back to Earth for a landing in Soviet territory. If all went well, the landing could take place by 1968. Meanwhile, the L-1, L-2, and L-3 designs were eventually finalized and prototype hardware could now be built. Other items were tested also: On the VOSKHOD 2 mission, launched on March 18, 1965, cosmonaut Alexei Leonov made the first "space walk" (EVA, or ExtraVehicular Activity) using a prototype of the pressure suit that would be used for the excursions on the lunar surface. No longer under political pressure from the Kremlin for space firsts after the ouster of Krush- chev, Korolev canceled the remaining manned VOSKHOD missions and put all his resources into the Moon project. Much valuable time had been lost developing these essentially dead-end missions. On July 16, 1965, the first piece of N-1 hardware was flight tested. The third stage of the N-1 was used in a two-stage version of the PROTON to launch a test satellite, named PROTON 1, into Earth orbit. Weighing 12.2 metric tons (26,800 pounds), it was the heaviest payload ever placed into orbit. A second test on November 2, 1965, which orbited PROTON 2, was equally successful. The third test flight, launched on March 24, 1966, was a failure. It would prove to be an ominous sign of things to come. Flight testing of the L-1 and L-2 hardware finally began in December of 1965. These sub-orbital flights, which continued until June of 1966, were to test the performance the spacecraft's recovery systems; an important prelude to in-orbit tests. Unfortunately, Kor- olev would not live to see it. He died on January 14, 1966, apparently from a botched operation to remove intestinal tumors. The Soviet space program in general and their lunar program in particular would never be the same after Korolev's passing. Shortly after Korolev's death, Premier Leonid Brezhnev put Korolev's assistant, Vasily P. Mishin, in charge of the Man-to-the-Moon program. Mishin quickly finished the consolidation process that Korolev began. No time could be lost now: The Americans had begun inflight testing of their Moonship, APOLLO. The first APOLLO flight, designated SA-201, was the first test of a fully functional APOLLO spacecraft launched on the new SATURN IB booster. The successful suborbital flight of February 26, 1966, went off without a hitch. An orbital test of the SATURN IB, SA-203, was launched on July 5 with a dummy payload. SA-202, launched on August 25, repeated SA-201's successful flight. Plans called for the first manned test of APOLLO in Earth orbit in the first quarter of 1967. From a hardware standpoint, the Soviets and Americans were neck and neck in the race to the Moon. Both nations had successfully tested their Moonships in suborbital tests. Both had tested the third stage of their Moon rockets as the second stage of smaller launch vehicles: The Soviets on their PROTON and the Americans with the SATURN IB. The Americans, however, had more in-flight experience. As their GEMINI program was drawing to a close in 1966, the Americans had accumulated much more flight time with longer missions, more EVA time, and - most importantly - they had more practical experience with the techniques of in-orbit rendezvous and docking. Despite continuing management problems, the Soviets pushed ahead with the first orbital tests of the L-1 spacecraft. On November 28, 1966, they finally launched the first L-1 into orbit aboard a SOYUZ launch vehicle. KOSMOS 133, as it was called, remained in Earth orbit for almost two days before it was brought down. During re-entry something went wrong: As a result of a manufacturing defect, the heatshield failed. While the capsule was successfully recovered, there was still significant damage to the module's interior. Further work on the L-1 was needed. Meanwhile in The United States, preparations for the first manned APOLLO flight, known as both APOLLO 1 and SA-204, were in full swing. The SATURN IB rocket was assembled and the APOLLO spacecraft was mated to its launch vehicle in January of 1967. During an on-pad countdown rehearsal on January 27, tragedy struck. While the three astronauts, Virgil I. Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee, were proceeding with the countdown rehearsal inside their spacecraft, an electrical fire started. Because of the pure oxygen atmosphere in the Command Module (CM) and an unforeseen availability of combustible materials, the flames quickly spread and in seconds the three astronauts, unable to escape quickly enough, died of suffocation. The tragedy stopped the APOLLO program in its tracks. A board of inquiry was formed and the whole APOLLO spacecraft design re-evaluated. The Soviets saw their chance to pull ahead. A second L-1 flight, KOSMOS 140, was launched on February 7, 1967, in a repeat of the failed KOSMOS 133 mission. Again the spacecraft left orbit after almost two days in space; and again, there was some sort of failure. The exact nature of the failure is not known, but it involved either the temperature control system, attitude control system, or the parachutes. While this time the heatshield worked well, there were still problems to be worked out on the L-1 and its sister, the L-2. Pressure from the Kremlin was beginning to build on those in the Soviet space program. The Soviet government gave formal approval to the plan to land a man on the Moon by the end of 1968. Failing this, the L-1 would be used to make a manned circumlunar flight using the PROTON. At the same time the N-1 Moon rocket project was put into high gear, with the third quarter of 1967 being the goal for the start of flight hardware construction. Despite two less than successful orbital test flights of the L-1, the next phase of flight testing was begun. The ultimate goal of the L-1 was to make a circumlunar flight; a flight to the Moon at his point would have been too big a leap because of the complexities of navigation and spacecraft control. As an interim step, it was decided to use the PROTON vehicle to launch an L-1 into an extended Earth orbit away from the influences of the Moon. This would allow the problems of long-range communications and spacecraft control to be worked out. It would also give the L-1 a realistic test of the re- entry conditions it would experience returning from an actual mission to the Moon. On March 10, 1967, the first four-stage version of the PROTON booster lifted the 5,017-kilogram (11,037-pound) L-1 test vehicle, KOSMOS 146, into a 177 by 296-kilometer (110 by 184-mile) parking orbit. After a short time, the PROTON's Block D escape stage would ignite and send KOSMOS 146 into its elongated orbit. Come time for ignition, though, nothing happened. The escape stage failed to ignite and KOSMOS 146 was stranded in space. Hoping to salvage at least some information from the mission, the spacecraft was separated from its useless booster, whose Earth orbit was rapidly decaying. KOSMOS 146 then used its own engines to lift itself into a higher 185 by 350- kilometer (115 by 218-mile) orbit. By the next day, the Block D escape stage fell out of orbit. KOSMOS 146 continued on in low Earth orbit for over eight days before it was commanded back. Again, the L-1, either during its flight or recovery, experienced some sort of system failure in its onboard control systems or its parachute. The problems were quickly corrected and another test flight, KOSMOS 154, was launched on April 8, 1967. As before, the PROTON's Block D escape stage failed to push the L-1 into the intended elon- gated Earth orbit. Again the spacecraft separated from its useless escape stage in hope of salvaging part of the mission. This time, however, there was yet another onboard system failure that prevented KOSMOS 154 from moving into a higher orbit. After eleven days in space, the lifeless spacecraft's orbit decayed and KOSMOS 154 burned up in Earth's atmosphere. After four unmanned orbital test flights of the L-1, the spacecraft had failed to perform as intended. Under normal circumstances there would have been more design evaluations and testing, but pressure on Mishin and the other space program managers was mounting. The government insisted that they catch up to and pass the United States during their reevaluation of the APOLLO program. Despite the problems of the L-1, its sister, the L-2, was to be pressed into service for the first Soviet manned spaceflight in two years. In the first L-2 flight, the Soviets wanted to catch up to and even surpass America's achievements of the GEMINI program. The plan called for an L-2 to be launched on a SOYUZ booster with one man on board. The large torroidal fuel tank would be empty on this flight to lighten the L-2 enough so that the SOYUZ launch vehicle could place it into orbit. The L-2's internal fuel reserves would be sufficient to carry out this and any future Earth orbital mission. The day after launch, a second L-2 would be launched into orbit, this time with a crew of three cosmonauts. The two spacecraft would rendezvous and dock. After docking, two of the crew members of the second L-2 would don spacesuits, depressurize the orbital module, and perform an EVA to transfer to the first L-2. After the crew transfer, the two space- craft would undock and perform independent missions. Each would return after spending about three days in Earth orbit. If this mission was successful, the Soviets would have performed the first docking of two manned spacecraft and the first crew transfer. In addition, they would gain the flight experience they needed to assemble their Moon craft in Earth orbit and later redock the L-2 and L-3 in lunar orbit. The mission had to succeed, but Mishin refused to approve the launch. He felt that it was too dangerous to commit the L-2 to a manned mission until the problems with the similar L-1 were solved. Moscow overruled him and the mission proceeded. The first L-2 would be manned by space veteran Vladimir Komarov, who flew on VOSKHOD 1 in 1964. The second L-2 was to be manned by cosmonauts Valeriy Bykovsky, Yevgeniy Khrunov, and Aleksey Yeliseyev. Khrunov and Yeliseyev would perform the EVA transfer. On the morning of April 23, 1967, the 6,450-kilogram (14,190-pound) L-2 named SOYUZ 1 was launched into orbit with Komarov aboard. With its unique design and extensive automated systems, it was the most complex and advanced manned spacecraft to fly and almost immediately problems started. One of the spacecraft's two solar panels would not deploy, depriving the SOYUZ of half its electrical power. Still later problems developed with the attitude control system. The launch of SOYUZ 2 was called off. There was no way the mission could be accomplished. All efforts were then poured into getting Komarov back. Ground control sent commands up to Komarov to help bring the malfunctioning spacecraft under control. A retrorocket burn on the fifteenth orbit would bring SOYUZ 1 back home. The attempt failed. As fuel ran low, Komarov got permission to try again on the seven- teenth orbit, but again he could not control the spacecraft. Komarov finally put the spacecraft into a spin to help stabilize it. On the eighteenth orbit, the cosmonaut finally succeeded and was on his way home. Because of the on board malfunctions, Komarov kept the re-entry module spinning, resulting in a high-gravity ballistic re-entry. The spinning spacecraft survived the re-entry, but when the landing para- chute was deployed the lines snarled, preventing it from opening fully. SOYUZ 1 with Komarov on board crashed into the ground at a speed of about 500 kilometers per hour (about 300 miles per hour) near the town of Orenburg in the Urals, one thousand kilometers (600 miles) off course. The pilot of the first manned SOYUZ flight was killed on impact. Komarov's body was cremated and his ashes were placed in the wall of the Kremlin. Like the Americans with APOLLO 1 only three months earlier, the haste to reach the Moon resulted in the death of one of the Soviet Union's best cosmonauts and a reevaluation of the design of the L-1 and L-2 Moon craft. End of Part One. Bibliography - Baker, David, THE HISTORY OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1981 Clark, Phillip S., THE SOVIET MANNED SPACE PROGRAM, 1988 Clark, Phillip S., "Correspondence: The PROTON Block D Stage and the N-1 Booster", SPACEFLIGHT (BIS), June 1990 Clark, Phillip S., "Soviet Rocket Engine Review", SPACEFLIGHT, July 1990 Gatland, Kenneth, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1981 and 1988 Harvey, Brian, RACE INTO SPACE: THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM, 1988 Harvey, Brian, "Promise Unfulfilled: The Soviet Unmanned Moon Programme, 1969-1988", JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INTERPLANETARY SOCIETY (JBIS), Volume 43, Number 9, 1990 Hendricks, Bart, "Correspondence: Soviet Moon Rocket's Sad Fate", SPACEFLIGHT, December 1989 Johnson, Nicholas L., HANDBOOK OF SOVIET LUNAR AND PLANETARY EXPLORATION, 1979 Johnson, Nicholas L., HANDBOOK OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1980 Johnson, Nicholas L., SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS 1980-85, 1987 Johnson, Nicholas L., THE SOVIET YEAR IN SPACE 1989, 1990 Kidger, Neville, "Glasnost and the Moon", SPACEFLIGHT, October 1989 Newkirk, Dennis, ALMANAC OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1990 Oberg, James E., RED STAR IN ORBIT, 1981 Pesavento, Peter, "Soviets to the Moon: The Untold Story", ASTRONOMY, December 1984 Pesavento, Peter, "A Review of Rumored Launch Failures in the Soviet Manned Program, Part 2: The Lunar Project/1968-1969", JBIS, Volume 43, Number 9, 1990 Young, Steven, "Soviet Union Was Far Behind in 1960s Moon Race", SPACEFLIGHT, January 1990 "Designer Mishin Speaks on Early Soviet Space Programmes and the Manned Lunar Project", SPACEFLIGHT, March 1990 "Soviet Lunar Lander Revealed", SPACEFLIGHT, July 1990 "Soviet Manned Lunar Mission Used Modified SOYUZ Spacecraft" AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, January 8, 1990 "Soviet Moon Flight Admission", SPACEFLIGHT, September 1989 "VOSKHOD 2 Flight Recalled", SPACEFLIGHT, June 1990 About the Author - Andrew J. LePage is a member of the Boston Group for the Study of the Soviet Space Program, Krasnaya Orbita. In addition to his interests in astronomical and space related topics, Andrew has been a serious observer of the Soviet space program for over one decade. Andrew is the author of "Mars 1994" in the March 1990 issue of the EJASA.