=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY *** SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- /pub/history/military/nato/naa/stc File: ak256stc.e NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION Draft Special Report Mr. Tom Lewis (United States) Special Rapporteur* International Secretariat October 1993 * Until this document has been approved by the Economic Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii INTRODUCTION 1 I. WHY ACQUIRE BALLISTIC MISSILES? 2 II. THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND TECHNOLOGY 2 A. Ballistic Missiles: Who Possesses Them, Who Wants Them 2 B. How They Are Acquired 6 C. Missile Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union 7 III. THE IMPACT OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION ON THE WEST 8 IV. PROLIFERATION COUNTERMEASURES 9 A. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 9 B. Missile Defence Systems 11 V. CONCLUSION 14 NOTES 16 ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The most effective and reliable device for delivering a chemical, biological, or nuclear warhead is a ballistic missile. Only a few nations possess the means to defend themselves against ballistic missiles and such defences are by no means completely effective. As a result, many nations are seeking to acquire ballistic missiles. This could pose a direct threat to armed forces which might be used to intervene in a conflict and also could place a relatively distant nation at risk. Nations seeking ballistic missiles can do so by developing them indigenously and by acquiring relevant technologies from abroad. In order to slow down missile acquisition 23 nations participate in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which is an agreement to follow common guidelines on exports of missiles and technologies. The MTCR is not "watertight" because some suppliers do not participate in the regime and because some nations find ingenious ways to circumvent the controls applied. Even so, the MTCR does make missile acquisition more difficult. Eventually, however, nations sufficiently determined to acquire ballistic missiles will do so. Consequently, interest is growing in missile defence technologies. In the United States, missile defence efforts now place more emphasis on providing protection from limited missiles attacks rather than wholesale strategic attack and elsewhere attention is being paid to defending forces in the field from missile attack as well as protecting national territory. Such actions are clearly prudent as, in the future, the threat of attack by ballistic missiles can only increase. The nations participating in the MTCR share a common goal but there is some scope for tension if export controls are not uniformly applied. There is also concern that the MTCR might needlessly restrict sales of hardware and technology which could be applied, for instance, to a nation's civilian space programme. Proposals may emerge to modify the MTCR in a number of ways in order to permit such sales while still restricting military-related exports. Such proposals should be carefully scrutinized in view of the ease with which civilian space technology can be adapted for military purposes. INTRODUCTION* 1. The aftermath of the end of the Cold War brought an almost palpable sense of relief around the globe. The disappearance of the threat of global nuclear war between East and West seemed to signal the beginning of an unprecedented era of peace and co-operation. This was not to be, however, as a multitude of conflicts and crises emerged such as the war to liberate Kuwait, civil war in the former Yugoslavia, and instability in the former Soviet Union. 2. While the likelihood of nuclear armageddon is now dramatically reduced, it is nevertheless evident that a multitude of new and less predictable threats to security is emerging as a result of regional instabilities and rivalries around the globe. Furthermore, any potential conflicts could have widespread consequences since weapons of mass destruction are proliferating. A key aspect of this is missile proliferation. A growing number of nations possess - or are seeking - missiles able to deliver munitions over long ranges and many of these nations harbour suspicions of or even hostility to the West. These weapons pose a threat to forces which may attempt to intervene in a regional conflict as well as to neighbouring or even distant nations. Although the issue of missile proliferation is not new per se, at no time in the past have so many potentially hostile states possessed these weapons or attempted to do so. And, although it is outside the scope of this Report, many of these nations seem also to be intent upon developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons which ultimately might be used to arm ballistic missiles. 3. Not surprisingly, many nations are attempting to prevent the spread of ballistic missile technology. Unfortunately, these efforts are not without problems. American protests about a prospective sale of Russian missile technology to India led to great controversy in Russia. Similarly, the American imposition of sanctions on China and Pakistan because of transfers of missile technology raised many complex issues. 4. This Report examines the increasing threat posed by missile proliferation. Chapter I gives a short overview of the motivation for developing nations to acquire ballistic missiles. Chapter II looks at the nations which possess ballistic missiles, as well as the ranges and payloads of the missiles. This section also deals with the sources of ballistic missiles and missile technology, and the major concerns related to the break-up of the Soviet Union in regard to missile proliferation. Chapter III focuses on the possible effects of ballistic missile proliferation in the developing world on Western security. Finally, Chapter IV deals with methods of combating missile proliferation including a brief discussion of anti-missile defence systems. * The Rapporteur would like to express his gratitude to Christopher Beecroft for his assistance in preparing this Report. I. WHY ACQUIRE BALLISTIC MISSILES? 5. For some developing nations ballistic missiles hold appeal for several reasons. In purely military terms, they are a very effective way of delivering munitions over long ranges since, at present, no nation has a wholly effective defence against ballistic missiles. Thus, the possession of ballistic missiles renders any potential adversary within range vulnerable to attack. As a result, these weapons can serve to intimidate a neighbour or deter an aggressor. In addition, ballistic missiles are perceived an effective means of resisting or at least challenging the West's greatly superior conventional warfighting capabilities. Furthermore, for countries such as Libya and Iraq which distrust and even fear the West (and the United States in particular), the capability to intimidate and perhaps restrain Western nations through a missile threat is seen as a valuable political asset. 6. Related to this concept is the military might and national prestige symbolized by ballistic missiles. Put simply, for many developing nations, ballistic missiles are a status symbol, an indication of power, self-reliance, and regional, if not continental or even global, influence. Ballistic missiles enable countries that might normally have limited international stature to have an impact beyond their actual size and strength. II. THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND TECHNOLOGY A. Ballistic Missiles: Who Possesses Them, Who Wants Them 7. The spread of missiles, missile components and missile technology among unpredictable and potentially hostile nations is quickly becoming one of the greatest challenges to the West in the post-Cold War era. At present, there are at least 15 Third World countries which possess ballistic missiles. By the year 2000, the number could rise to over 24. Of these, 15 or more may be able by then to produce ballistic missiles independently. Furthermore, at least three may have missiles with intercontinental ranges by the year 2000. 8. In view of the nations with ballistic missile programmes - North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran and Iraq - it is not surprising that the international community is concerned. Table 1 lists those nations with ballistic missile programmes. B. How They Are Acquired 9. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the largest exporter of military hardware in the developing world. Moreover, China has demonstrated a willingness to sell arms to virtually every and any country that places an order, so long as it can pay in hard currency. As large sales of weapons to nations such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya clearly indicate, even "pariah" states are viewed as acceptable customers. This "liberal" arms-trade policy also covers the sale of ballistic missile equipment and technology. To cite just a few examples, in 1988, China sold several intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Saudi Arabia; in mid-1990, it was revealed that China had exported lithium hydrate (which can be used in the production of nerve gas, missile fuel, and nuclear weapons) to Iraq and Libya; in 1991, China allegedly sold a large number of M-9 surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) to Syria and trade in missile components has taken place with Pakistan, a matter discussed later in this Report. The fact that many of these and other sales violate international agreements (such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, which the Chinese have pledged to abide by) or disregard United Nations embargoes seems to have little effect on China's choice of customers. 10. China has also provided technical assistance, especially to previous or potential customers. For example, in April 1991 there were reports that China was advising Algeria and Iran on how to combine nuclear weapons with different missile delivery systems. Syria has received assistance from China with its missile production programme. China also helped Egypt to modernize its domestic missile production facilities. 11. Russia has sold advanced missile equipment and technology to China for hard currency and, surprisingly, in view of China's long-time association with countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran, Israel has also supplied the Chinese with advanced missile-related technology.(1) Israel is reported to have supplied the Chinese with sophisticated missile guidance technology, much of which originated in the United States.(2) Thus, at least indirectly, China has limited access to precisely the type of technology the United States does not want to make available to the developing world. Moreover, as stated earlier, the Chinese have few qualms about their choice of customers and there is little reason to believe that they will show any more restraint when it comes to the more advanced weapons systems obtained from Russia or Israel. Understandably, concern in the West over the re-export to Third World nations of high-tech missiles, missile components, and technical data has risen substantially in recent years. 12. China, however, is not alone in its liberal approach to missile related exports. North Korea has made significant sales to Middle East nations, and has recently been marketing its new Nodong I missile, which has a 1,000 kilometre range. Iran is reportedly close to finalizing a deal to buy the missile. Brazil, too, has shown little hesitation in selling arms to practically any country that can pay. Furthermore, many of the "pariah" nations are quite eager to pool their efforts so there is a kind of "mutual assistance" programme between many developing nations in regard to their ballistic missile programmes. Thus, many Third World missiles, particularly variants of the widely-used Scud missile, contain upgraded hardware from numerous countries. C. Missile Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union 13. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the task of trying to prevent developing nations from acquiring ballistic missiles and missile technology was difficult by any standards. The complexities of the current situation, however, make the earlier one seem almost straightforward and benign by comparison. 14. A large illegal arms trade has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several developments have enabled resourceful individuals and criminal groups in countries such as Russia and Ukraine to acquire and sell (with no questions asked) virtually any piece of military hardware that exists in the former Soviet arsenal, including ballistic missile hardware. There are three primary factors that have made this situation possible: - it is simply impossible to assure that all bases and weapons storage and production facilities in the CIS are being properly guarded and monitored; - law enforcement agencies of the CIS lack the equipment, personnel and training to combat the generally wealthy, well-organized, and well-equipped criminal organizations which are responsible for much of the illegal arms trade in the former Soviet Union; - the miserable and depressing conditions that many soldiers now find themselves in have made it relatively simple for well-financed criminals or unscrupulous "entrepreneurs" to make monetary offers that are extremely difficult to refuse. (For example, in March 1992, it was reported that a former Soviet Army officer offered technical data and blueprints for an 8,100-kilogram Soviet cruise missile to an Israeli private detective for $5,000.)(3) 15. In addition, there have been reports of former Soviet weapons factories operating on their own accord independently of official control. In such instances, a weapons production facility arranges to sell some piece of hardware or information directly to a foreign customer.(4) 16. There is substantial concern over the possibility of weapons experts being lured abroad by offers of work and large amounts of money from foreign governments. Thousands of highly-trained weapons experts have lost their jobs due to the closure of military production and research facilities in the former Soviet Union. One only has to consider the position in which these people now find themselves to understand why an offer of many thousands of dollars might tempt some of them to go abroad for several months to work on a ballistic missile programme. 17. In regard to missile-related sales, Russia agreed in early 1991 to sell cryogenic rocket engines and related technology to India, which claims that the technology is to be used only for space-related purposes. This sale was strongly opposed by the United States due to the dual-use nature of the technology. (This subject is addressed in more detail later in the Report). Russia has also sold rocket engines and rocket guidance and missile technology to China, which as mentioned earlier is itself a major source of missile equipment and technology for much of the developing world. III. THE IMPACT OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION ON THE WEST 18. The proliferation of ballistic missiles on a large scale, as well as the spread of weapons of mass destruction (i.e chemical, biological and nuclear weapons) to be used with these missiles, has profound and far-reaching implications for nations in the East and the West and their security. First and foremost, their ability to act in regional conflicts, even where their interests are seriously threatened, could well be greatly reduced. 19. If in the future there is another large-scale conflict in the Middle East, for example, Western nations might well be deterred from taking action if it is known that one of the belligerents possesses ballistic missiles tipped with chemical or nuclear warheads. 20. In short, the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction is likely to give regional adversaries political and military leverage that was inconceivable only a couple of years ago. The proliferation of missiles and mass-destruction weapons could very well result in an extremely conservative approach to decision making in assessing whether Western nations should become involved in regional conflicts, even when their interests are at stake. Whatever the case, Western military strategy for dealing with regional conflicts will be dramatically affected and potentially undermined by the spread of missiles and unconventional weapons. IV. PROLIFERATION COUNTERMEASURES A. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 21. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 by the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany, and Japan. Currently there are 23 signatories (5) and two more - Argentina and Hungary - have requested participation in the regime. Russia too has stated its intention to join the regime but there are some doubts about the status of its application. Certainly, Russia has agreed to abide by the MTCR's guidelines as have China and Israel. 22. The purpose of the MTCR is to control the spread of technology that would enable other countries to acquire ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear payload of more than 500 kilograms over 300 kilometres. The regime places restrictions on two categories of exports. Category I regulates the sale of missiles and complete missile sub-systems such as guidance systems and rocket stages. Category II deals primarily with items such as propellant, motor cases, launch support equipment, instrumentation, certain types of wind tunnel, and production equipment. In January 1993, the MTCR nations adopted revised guidelines to extend the regime's scope to missiles capable of delivering biological or chemical weapons. 23. Parties in the regime agree to follow guidelines on export control lists and to share information on all cases where sales are denied so that no party derives commercial advantages. The parties also undertake not to re-export relevant missile equipment without authorization. 24. While the aims of the MTCR are admirable, it is by no means completely "watertight". Nations wishing to acquire ballistic missiles may circumvent the regime's restrictions in a number of ways. 25. So long as there is a demand for ballistic missiles, there will be nations, companies, and individuals willing to disregard export controls and bans in the name of profit. To facilitate purchases from such suppliers, countries attempting to develop or acquire ballistic missiles have become increasingly adept at establishing "dummy" and front companies to avoid export controls. Thus, the routes and methods used to transfer ballistic missiles are usually well disguised and extremely difficult to uncover, and the transfer of smaller missile components and technical data is essentially undetectable. Therefore, since verifying ballistic missile and missile component transfers is so difficult, the effective enforcement of export controls under the MTCR poses difficulties. 26. Another problem is that much of the missile hardware and technology that is used for peaceful, civilian purposes can be converted to military use. India, for example, used the same first stage on its "Agni" IRBM as it did on its Space Launch Vehicle (SLV). Also, trying to determine in every case whether or not a nation intends to adapt "peaceful" technology to an offensive missile programme is highly problematic. 27. Finally, the MTCR is not subscribed to by all the potential suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technologies. 28. Essentially, the MTCR can delay the acquisition of ballistic missiles by developing nations, but cannot prevent it. This is unfortunate but not surprising. Ballistic missiles are not at the forefront of technology. Germany managed to produce them half a century ago. Given the will, the resources and the time, most nations with relatively modest industrial bases, by today's standards, could develop effective ballistic missiles. 29. In recent months, the MTCR has attracted a great deal of attention. The United States and Russia had a disagreement about the sale to India of Russian cryogenic rocket engines and the technology to make them. The sale, worth about $350 million was agreed in 1991 but, according to the United States, breached MTCR guidelines which Russia had agreed to follow. Failure to resolve the issue led the United States to impose sanctions on Russia in June 1993 but their implementation was deferred pending further discussions. 30. The engines and technology in question were, according to India, to be used for India's space programme and India accused the United States of attempting to block the sale in order to limit competition for satellite launchers. In fact, while cryogenic engines are not ideal for military use, it would certainly be possible to use them for military purposes. 31. In July 1993, Russian negotiators in the United States announced that the issue had been resolved. Russia decided to become a party to the MTCR and would revise its contract to India such that the sale of the production equipment would be frozen but that the sale of the engines themselves would go ahead. It was reported that the United States would compensate Russia for the lost sale. 32. This was by no means the end of the matter. Several members of the Russian parliament condemned the government's decision and pointed out that the MTCR decision would have to be ratified in parliament. The chairman of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, called the decision a "national disgrace" and said that it called into question the independence of Russian foreign policy. Criticism was also expressed by Glavkosmos, the agency responsible for commercializing Russian space technology. The basis for the criticism is that it erodes international confidence in Russia as a vendor of space technology. 33. As for the practical effects of the aborted sale, it is estimated that it would take India about a decade to develop the cryogenic engine technology domestically. 34. The United States declared that it was open to space co-operation with India if it becomes an observer in the MTCR. 35. In August 1993, the MTCR again caused international headlines when the United States imposed sanctions on China and Pakistan for infringing MTCR guidelines in a transfer of equipment from China to Pakistan in November 1992. After many enquiries to Chinese and Pakistani authorities had failed to resolve American concerns about the transfer, the United States was obliged to impose sanctions on the "entities" involved in the transaction, in this case the Chinese Ministry of Defence and some of its subsidiaries and the Pakistani Ministry of Defence. 36. The assessment was made that a Category II transfer had taken place but that evidence on a Category I transfer was ambiguous. Under American law, once such a determination is made, sanctions are mandatory. In this case, sanctions will be imposed for two years and will cost up to $1 billion in lost sales to China in that period. The effect on trade with Pakistan will be minimal. 37. The other participants in the MTCR were notified of the decision and are expected to review their trade with China on items covered by the MTCR. 38. Not surprisingly, China and Pakistan have denied that the shipment in question involved missile technology and China has warned that it will review its adherence to MTCR guidelines. It also threatened to withdraw co-operation in United Nations activities intended to curb weapons proliferation. B. Missile Defence Systems 39. The difficulties of controlling the spread of ballistic missile technology can slow down but not prevent nations from acquiring ballistic missiles. And as missiles proliferate the likelihood of their being used deliberately or by accident will grow. 40. Concern about ballistic missiles has led several Western nations to examine defensive systems primarily intended to protect their forces from ballistic missile attack. Since these would have to defend relatively small areas and since the launch areas - or at least directions - are likely to be known in broad terms, such defences would be technically less demanding than those needed to protect large areas from a broad range of threats. The use of the Patriot missile in the Gulf conflict demonstrated the feasibility of missile defence and anti-aircraft missiles now under development could be enhanced to provide even more capability. Russia, in fact, has already developed the S-300V "Giant" anti-tactical missile specifically to provide protection against ballistic missiles, and some Russian ship-borne surface-to-air missiles are believed to offer limited capability against tactical ballistic missiles. 41. In the West, the United States has the most ambitious plans to counter tactical ballistic missiles. Progress is being made in modifying the Patriot to improve its performance in intercepting tactical missiles and several other programmes are in hand to produce new types of missile interceptors. These include the Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) programme, and the Corps-SAM. Deployment decisions have yet to be made but the THAAD programme includes production of an operational prototype which should be available for emergency use in 1996. THAAD will have a range of possibly up to 280 kilometres and will be a "hit-to-kill" system which collides directly with its target rather than using an explosive fragmentation warhead. ERINT would be a shorter range system which is essentially in competition with an up-graded Patriot. ERINT is smaller than Patriot - four ERINTs can fit into one Patriot launcher - but the choice between the two systems will depend on assessments of relative lethality against various types of tactical missile. Corps-SAM is intended to be a highly mobile low-to-medium altitude replacement for the HAWK anti-aircraft missile currently in service. It would also provide an anti-tactical missile capability. (There is some discussion in the United States about developing a Tactical Agile Missile which would replace Corps-SAM, ERINT and Patriot in one consolidated system). 42. Naturally, a wide variety of sensors is also being explored to provide early warning and control of anti-tactical missile systems. In addition, the United States Navy is exploring ways to provide its vessels with defences against ballistic missiles and to extend protection to forces deployed ashore. 43. Elsewhere in the Alliance, many new SAM systems under development are being examined for their potential as missile interceptors. These include the ASAM-120, a system derived from the NASAMS, a surface-to-air system to be purchased by Norway incorporating a modified air-to-air missile. With some modifications, this system could have some potential against ballistic missiles. The Franco-Italian Eurosam consortium is investigating the possibility of producing an anti-tactical missile (ATM) variant of its Aster missile. Potential requirements for surface-to-air missiles with anti-tactical missile capabilities have been identified by France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Israel is also vigorously developing anti-tactical missile technology under its Arrow programme. In addition, China, India, Japan and Taiwan have ATM projects in hand. 44. More ambitious missile defence schemes are also in preparation in the United States although the emphasis on strategic defences has declined recently. As last year's Report on Missile Defence Technology explained, the United States has shifted the focus of its Strategic Defense Initiative towards smaller scale threats and proposed a Global Protection System (GPS) to be developed internationally. During his visit to the United States in June 1992, President Yeltsin agreed with President Bush to co-operate with the West and its friends and allies on the development of the GPS to defend against limited missile strikes and weapons of mass destruction. Besides negating or greatly reducing the threat of ballistic missiles, it is argued that a GPS would also serve to deter nations from acquiring ballistic missiles; if the missiles cease to have military or political value, then the incentive to acquire them will also cease. 45. Of course, the decision whether or not to deploy a GPS will be enormously complicated. In the first place, there will no doubt be many technical options for a GPS, each with specific capabilities (or combinations of capabilities) and costs. During this time of military cutbacks throughout the Alliance, support for a new multi-billion dollar defence project could be hard to find. Furthermore, deciding how to share the costs among the participating nations is likely to be difficult and formulating an acceptable structure for command-and-control would also be a formidable task. 46. The nuclear forces of countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and China must also be taken into account when considering the deployment of GPS. Obviously these countries do not want their nuclear deterrents to be rendered impotent. 47. Finally, deploying GPS would require a major overhaul of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. A re-working of the ABM Treaty would necessitate a great deal of negotiating and would undoubtedly generate great controversy although, since Russia and the United States have agreed to explore the GPS, this undertaking is clearly a politically viable possibility. 48. Decisions on missile defence by the Clinton Administration have shifted the focus of American work much more squarely on theatre defences. Although space-based sensors are still on the agenda, space-based interceptors have been removed apart from essentially laboratory-scale work. The Strategic Defence Organization (SDIO) has been re-named the Ballistic Missile Defence Organization (BDMO) to reflect this change in emphasis. At present, funding levels remain unchanged for 1994 but this is under review for subsequent years. It is not yet clear how the change in emphasis on missile defences will affect GPS. 49. In view of the growing threat of ballistic missile proliferation, it is not surprising that many nations are now investigating ways of defending themselves or their armed forces in the field from ballistic missiles. Indeed, it would be irresponsible to ignore missile defences. V. CONCLUSION 50. Missile proliferation presents a clear long-term threat to security and stability. If only some of the reports concerning missile technology and hardware acquisition in the developing world are fully accurate, there are still substantial grounds for concern, particularly since several nations seem intent on acquiring nuclear and chemical weapons with which to arm ballistic missiles. 51. Missile proliferation is cause for a fundamental rethinking of Western, and in particular American, military strategies for regional conflicts. During the Gulf War, Iraq used Scud missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia. Militarily, the generally inaccurate Scuds had limited value. As an agent of fear, however, the missiles had a significant impact. It will not be long before other countries are able to use far more accurate and powerful weapons that would be more militarily effective. The West must be prepared to handle this threat should it once again find itself embroiled in a regional conflict. 52. Missile proliferation is already a significant threat and it can only grow worse. As it does so, if the West wishes to continue to have the freedom to defend itself and its allies interests on a global level, it will need the wherewithal to defend its forces and perhaps its own territory against ballistic missiles. This is not to say that taking steps to slow down proliferation should be dismissed, but rather it is an acknowledgement that, ultimately, countries that wish to acquire missiles will succeed in doing so. 53. That said, the Missile Technology Control Regime's role as an impediment to proliferation is a useful one. Argentina, South Africa and Taiwan have all recently abandoned their ballistic missile programmes and the MTCR should be credited with playing some part in that. It must be pointed out, however, that the MTCR could pose problems for its members as well as those nations attempting to develop missile technology. When Russia agreed to limit its sale of missile technology to India, as noted earlier, there were accusations that the United States was attempting to limit competition in the space launcher market. However, the imposition of sanctions on China and Pakistan which could cost the United States up to $1 billion in lost sales to China clearly show that the effort to curb missile proliferation takes precedence over commercial considerations. 54. Nevertheless, there is scope for deriving commercial advantage from any international export control regime. Nations which do not apply agreed controls rigorously could fulfil orders which other nations would refuse. Accusations about such practices caused a great deal of tension in the 1980s between the nations applying COCOM controls. Clearly, a similar situation should be avoided with the MTCR. 55. It should also be noted that there is concern about MTCR restrictions hampering legitimate space activities in developing nations. It is argued that assisting such nations with legitimate activities would provide much needed business for the hard-pressed aerospace sector. Proponents of this view have suggested that the MTCR should have provisions rather like those in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which encourage assistance with civil activities in return for abstention from military programmes. This would be extremely difficult to apply in the missile field because of the similarity between civilian and military technologies. Diversions or rapid adaptations from civil to military applications would not be very difficult. Clearly, any overhaul of missile technology export controls should keep such considerations very much in mind. NOTES (1) Michael Gordon, The International Herald Tribune, 19 October 1992. (2) Richard Bitzinger, "Arms to go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World", International Security, Fall 1992, (Vol.7, No.2). Reports of Israeli assistance and sales to China have appeared in the press several times over the last five years, most notably when China sold Missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988. The missiles were reportedly built with Israeli technology that was acquired from the United States. The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times both reported in October 1991 that Israel was aiding China with missile guidance systems. (3) Missile Monitor, Monterey Institute for International Studies, Spring 1993 (no.3). (4) "Soviet arms going for bargain prices", The Times, 6 February 1993. "Psst! Want to buy some plutonium?", The European, 5-8 November 1992. (5) The member nations are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Table 1: Missile and Space Launch Capabilities of Selected Countries (*) See file: ak256a.tif ak256b.tif ak256c.tif